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OPINION*
________________
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
In March 2015, the District Court, apparently uncertain how to read our prior
remand, ordered Petitioner Robert Lincoln’s immediate release from state custody, citing
the Commonwealth’s failure to comply with the deadline set by Lincoln’s conditional
writ of habeas corpus. We vacate and remand for the District Court to consider whether
to grant the Commonwealth a retroactive extension of the deadline.
I.
In April 2014, the District Court issued a conditional writ of habeas corpus
requiring that Lincoln’s right to a direct appeal in the Pennsylvania Superior Court be
reinstated within ninety days. When the Commonwealth had thirteen days left to comply,
we granted a stay of the conditional writ pending appeal. On Friday, December 12, 2014,
we affirmed the District Court and lifted the stay. Lincoln v. Warden Smithfield SCI, 595

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
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F. App’x 143 (3d Cir. 2014). At that time, the Commonwealth had until December 25 to
reinstate Petitioner’s direct appeal in the Superior Court.
On Monday, December 15, the Commonwealth notified the Superior Court that it
no longer opposed reinstating Lincoln’s direct appeal on the merits. On Monday,
December 22, after the Superior Court had not acted, the Commonwealth obtained what
it hoped was the next-best thing—an order from a judge of the Philadelphia Court of
Common Pleas reinstating the appeal. The Commonwealth provided the District Court
with a copy of this order. On Tuesday, December 30, Lincoln moved in the District
Court for a writ of execution ordering his immediate release. The Commonwealth
notified the Superior Court of Lincoln’s motion and, on January 5, 2015, the Superior
Court reinstated Lincoln’s direct appeal on the merits. This was six business days after
the deadline had expired.
When the Superior Court’s reinstatement order was brought before the District
Court, the Commonwealth ultimately asked it to extend retroactively the deadline to
January 5 in order to account for the delay. The Court, however, granted Lincoln’s writ
of execution because the Commonwealth had “failed to comply with the order of the
Court of Appeals.” The District Court may have thought it was not free to extend the
deadline based on our December 2014 opinion. But to give the Commonwealth the
opportunity to clarify matters on further appeal to us, the Court stayed the writ of
execution pending this appeal.
II.
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The District Court had continuing jurisdiction over Lincoln’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We have jurisdiction to review its writ of execution
per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).
We exercise plenary review over whether the District Court correctly interpreted
the instructions of our prior opinion in Lincoln’s habeas proceedings. Gibbs v. Frank,
500 F.3d 202, 206 (3d Cir. 2007).
III.
Federal district courts exercising habeas review have the discretion to modify the
time period set in a conditional writ so long as it is “reasonable under the circumstances.”
Id. at 207. We clarify that nothing in our December 2014 opinion deprived the District
Court of its discretion to grant an extension. Lincoln had asked for his immediate release
on appeal, but we found no “convincing reason to disturb the relief the District Court
awarded.” Lincoln, 595 F. App’x at 146. We then lifted our stay of the Court’s
conditional writ and noted that “[i]f the Commonwealth needs more than 13 days to
comply with the conditional writ, it should move the District Court to modify its Order.”
Id. In these circumstances, the District Court retained the power to extend retroactively
the deadline. See Gibbs, 500 F.3d at 208 (“[I]t is of no moment whether the
Commonwealth seeks an extension directly from the District Court during the initial
deadline or . . . provides a post hoc justification for the trial delay.”). Because the District
Court thought it was constrained in granting an extension, we vacate its order granting
the writ of execution.
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Moreover, our own review of the record suggests that the Commonwealth
substantially complied with that deadline. The 13-day delay in having the Superior Court
reinstate the direct appeal was due to circumstances outside the Commonwealth’s control.
And, for its part, the Commonwealth acted quickly during the holiday season to notify the
Superior Court that Lincoln’s direct appeal needed to be reinstated by December 25 and it
sought an alternative method of compliance in the Court of Common Pleas.1 In these
circumstances, an extension would seem reasonable, though the District Court, with its
in-depth association with the facts of this case, deserves the first look. Hence we vacate
and remand.

1

The Commonwealth also argues on appeal that it complied with the December 25
deadline by obtaining an order from the Court of Common Pleas. We do not reach this
argument in vacating the District Court’s order.
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